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Today, very few attorneys in the United States receive any training in
philosophy prior to obtaining their law degree. Philosophy is not a
requirement in American law schools. The few law school graduates that
have training in philosophy have sought it out. The absence of philosophy
requirements in our law schools have resulted in law school graduates
suffering from relatively narrow minds. The students arrive at law school
self-expressive, but leave indoctrinated in modernist ways. It is as if law
school was meant to narrow their minds, not broaden them.
Without a grounding in the philosophy of law, the law school graduates
become nafve true believers in the modem legal process. This process, from
my postmodern neopopulist perspective, is a raft of nafvet6 about what the
law and the rule of law really is, practically speaking.
However, even if the law schools were to require philosophy, American
law schools would likely teach bad philosophy based on a classically
western Platonic-Aristotelian theory of meaning and knowledge in which
words refer to absolute meanings transcending the "misuse" of human
language. Knowledge is rooted, in turn, in these absolute meanings. Plato
thought that words were invented to refer to absolute meanings intuited by
experts - the philosopher kings.' Aristotle thought that only experience
(induction) could reveal these absolute essences to us, but that they were
objective and that, again, words are invented to refer to them.2 Plato asked
us to believe in philosophical experts.3 Aristotle asked us to believe in
scientific experts.' Both kinds of experts could in principle have an
1. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (G. R. F. Ferrari ed. & Tom Griffith trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2000).
2. See ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, IN THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE: THE
REVISED OXFORD TRANSLATION (Jonathan Barnes ed., Princeton University Press 1984).
3. PLATO, supra note 1.
4. ARISTOTLE, supra note 2.
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absolutely private grasp of what words were actually invented to refer to.
And this kind of knowledge is the foundation of all other knowledge.
Expert knowledge, supposedly, has no dependence upon the use words are
put to democratically. The people can be all wrong. The private language,
which is what the language of contemporary science often verges on as a
purported description of Reality, is supposedly more truthful than ordinary
language. This principle literally defines modernity.
These days, philosophically nafve jurists - those who do not have a clue
about the postmodern philosophical revolution which rejects the modem
and classical referential theories of linguistic meaning - still ask us to
believe that the positive law, the static text of statutes and constitutions, has
an absolute referential meaning. This is what, again, makes judges experts;
the philosopher kings who supposedly know what the law really is, what the
positive law really means. Implicit to this view of judicial Reality is that
judges know in part because they are proficient at imposing coherence on
the text of the law after pinning down the absolute meaning of a few key
terms, if not many key terms.
This kind of referentialism is not just a classical view of meaning,
knowledge, and expertise, it is also the modem, Enlightenment view of all
truly rational language about justice. It is part and parcel of modem
"objectivism." John Locke, among many others, believed that universal
reason, leads to universal principles of justice.' That reason is rooted in
what is often called "contract" theories of justice - a clear reference to the
comerstone of republican law.
But if this classical and modem tradition about meaning and knowledge
is true, then why is it that judges issue such diverse opinions about the
meaning of the positive law? Why do they exhibit such radically different
versions of judicial reason? Why do they have such different views of
justice and therefore such different interpretations of the positive law where
these interpretations are based, in the first place, on the assumption that the
law is just? In order to prove that the statute or the constitution is already
just, they turn it to their presumably just end.
Perhaps we need to consider the possibility that the static text of the law
is not in itself either just or unjust, but just static text, subject, as a matter of
practical fact, not just to interpretation, but radical interpretation. In order to
keep it just, or make it just in the first place, judges understand implicitly
that they must impose a concept of justice, rooted in an entire tradition, an
entire view of Reality, upon it.
Now lest I alienate conservatives too early in my thought to get them to
5. See JOHN LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (The Open Court
Publ'g Co. 1920).
No. 21 209
210 UNIV. OF ST THOMAS JOURNAL OFLAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. IX
travel with me for a while down this postmodern road, let me assure you
that I am not a radical relativist. Neither is Notre Dame philosopher
Alasdair MacIntyre from whom I have taken a large part of my postmodern
theory of linguistic meaning and knowledge.6
I believe that the use of language, where the meaning of it is its use, is
entirely tradition-bound. But this does not mean that a particular tradition is
not absolutely true. In other words, like conservatives, I believe in the
immutability of human nature. I am not looking for some new fantastic
form of human consciousness like contemporary liberals and ideological
scientists. Among all of the rival traditions in this world, including
liberalism and conservatism, the use of language in one or another may be
much more practical, much healthier morally speaking.
Indeed, I believe that the Christian revelation was simply God's way of
taking over ordinary language and that secular experts ever since have been
trying to destroy ordinary language for this infection. Ever since the
Christian revelation we have had language with which to express our
humanity, our existential predicament, and its solutions much better than
we could before. Christian language is quintessentially practical language,
truly moral language.
Now, the word "tradition," per my understanding of MacIntyre, is an
agreement among people to use language in a certain way to describe
human experience which is universal. That is: groups of people use
language differently to describe the same human experience we are all
experiencing.
This use of the word "tradition" explains well the disagreement about
the recent ISIS beheading of the Egyptian Copts on the beach in Libya.'
The Egyptian Copts, per their tradition, consider the victims' martyrs to the
Coptic faith.9 ISIS, per their tradition, do not consider the victims as martyrs
because they were not Muslims and the killings were just.10
One important word used when comparing traditions is their
6. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE, WHICH RATIONALITY? (University of
Notre Dame Press, 1988).
7. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, COMMUNITY, LAW AND THE IDIOM AND RHETORIC OF
RIGHTS, Listening 26, 100 (1991).
8. CNN Staff, ISIS video appears to show beheadings of Egyptian Coptic Christians in
Libya, CNN NEWS (Feb. 16, 2015, 7:34AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/15/middleeast/isis-
video-beheadings-christians.
9. Jessilyn Justice, Jesus' Was the Last Word of Egyptian Christians ISIS Beheaded,
CHARISMA NEWS (Feb. 19, 2015, 5:00PM), http://www.charismanews.com/world/48401-jesus-
was-the-last-word-of-egyptian-christians-isis-beheaded.
10. Zeinab E1-Gundy, Islamic State publishes report on Coptic Egyptian workers kidnapped
in Libya, AHRAM ONLINE
(Feb. 12, 2015), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/122903/Egypt/Politics-/Islamic-
State-publishes-report-on-Coptic-Egyptian-.aspx.
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"commensurability." Two or more traditions can have different degrees of
commensurability. ISIS and Copts appear to be completely incommensurate
in light of the beheadings. Similar commensurability analysis could be
applied to ideologies, cultures, academics and viewpoints - anywhere
where there is a different use of language. For example, the traditions of
Republicans and Democrats in 1860 (or even today) could be viewed as
wildly incommensurate.
Finally, the consideration of traditions and their incommensurability
leads to discussion of the government and its role vis-A-vis the people.
Governments do develop a tradition, an agreement among government
officials and employees on how to use language in a certain way as to
human experience. That government tradition can be commensurate with
the people's tradition, or it can be incommensurate.
Because a government's tradition can be incommensurate with the
people's tradition, particular attention is needed to show how a tradition
becomes dominant culturally, politically or both. Of particular importance
is the question of just revolution - a topic visited by the founders of the
United States over two centuries ago. At that time, the Founders deemed the
government's tradition incommensurate with the people's tradition - and
fought the Revolutionary War because they meant it. Understanding
traditions and degrees of incommensurability was the essential building
block for the founding of the United States.
Importantly, Maclntyre does not think that the tradition-bound nature of
all human thought and action is a problem looking for a solution." And of
course neither do I. In fact it is the solution - the solution to
liberalism. Maclntyre is saying: stop being a liberal. Stop trying to live in
between, outside of, above all tradition. This is a phony, inauthentic way of
life.12 Liberalism is just a rival tradition hawking the myth of universal
standards of rational justification generating universal principles of justice.
It is the most inauthentic tradition of all for pretending to be more than a
rival tradition. Maclntyre mentions many philosophically sophisticated
liberal theorists who have finally admitted that liberalism is just a
competing tradition because of the absence of universal standards of
rational justification.13 This includes Richard Rorty who is, of course, a
pragmatist - as I am.
Basically, liberalism has expired and is all but interred. And this will
lead to the total deconstruction of the modem legal system - eventually.
11. MACINTYRE, supra note 6.
12. I think Professor John Kekes is saying much the same thing. See JOHN KEKES, AGAINST
LIBERALISM (Cornell Univ. Press, 1997).
13. MACINTYRE, supra note 6.
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The way I view my job is to hasten its demise.
Now, we return to law school graduates. Law school graduates find
themselves in this pass6 modem world assuming that the language of the
law is referential, and in that sense, absolute. We implicitly teach them to
fight in their briefs and in their oral arguments for meanings for words as if
these meanings are, or should be, absolute. But if anything is absolutely
clear to anyone who examines their experience, especially their legal
experience, even briefly, it is that people, and especially lawyers, use
language any damn way they please. It is all a war of words - manipulation
on a grand, institutional scale. It is not actually a rational, "objective"
process in which opinions (which are so often complex, and ultimately
based upon the judge's whole view of Reality) can be verified or even
falsified by the text of the positive law.
Our practical reality is that the rule of law is the rule of a dominant
tradition. This is the tradition, the view of Reality, in terms of which the
positive law, like our U.S. Constitution, is typically interpreted.
Conservatives have been screaming out my thesis without understanding
what they are saying: the Constitution has been subverted to the liberal
view of Reality which has its own peculiar account of reason and justice.
That is correct.
The rule of law is nothing more and, mind you, nothing less, than a
dominant tradition about the nature of moral reason and justice, applied to a
very plastic body of legal text, which can often be deconstructed because of
its conflicts and inconsistency. That is, the static text of the positive law,
presents competing, rival traditions with plenty of opportunity to make that
text coherent in competing, incommensurate ways.
Postmodem philosophy teaches us that the meanings of words are
determined by their use. Or rather, the meaning of language is quite literally
identical with its use. Language is a tool. It is a practical affair, which
serves the goals of preachers, politicians, judges and lawyers, in context. In
this case, educating law students would involve teaching them that words
are in fact weapons, which is what their experience will teach them anyway.
Practicing law without postmodem philosophical sophistication leaves
law school graduates as neophytes, blindly groping for the supposedly
objective legal principles of justice. Now remember, I am not actually
saying that there are not absolute principles of justice from God's point of
view. I am saying that this content, these principles, are inseparable from
our account of legal reason as a whole, and therefore, from an entire
tradition. One tradition may be absolutely true. But the search is not going
to be based on universal standards of rational justification. There are none.
There is only a pragmatic test for truth. First of all, our view of justice will
tend to be one which gets us what we want. That will lead us to suspect it is
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true. But then, we will also find out whether what we want is really what we
ought to want. This is actually a universal human experience, not the
application of some purely logical standard of truth.
The postmodern lawyer sees justice in context, as inevitably part of a
tradition imposed by a judge who is expressing solidarity with his group.
He will never admit this, and this is a large part of the tragedy, the bad faith,
of the modem legal tradition. This dishonesty, Nietzsche and Christians
would agree, is quite childish. A proper philosophical grounding aids in
avoiding both this tiresome dishonesty and tactical legal errors.
This is not to suggest that victory is always the goal. This is just more
nafvet6. My clients have many legal goals, only a fraction of which is a
totally favorable judgment. Sometimes we know this is unlikely, and we
proceed in order to achieve other goals. One of those goals is to prove our
postmodern point about the tradition - relative nature of justice, about the
rule of law as the tradition of the judge.
This in turn, demonstrates the need to elect our judges in order to avoid
being ruled by people who think that they are experts, not about some
harmless technical reality, but Reality itself - what is good and just. One of
our goals is the harassment of the modem legal system. My cases, taken as
a whole, are a powerful form of civil disobedience. I take cases that I know
will result in radical decisions, which the common man will find ridiculous
if not absurd. This is a primary method for discrediting the bench's
reasoning - and the bench - in the eyes of the people. And, that is the
beginning of the end of "elitist" and "expert" judges "objectively"
determining the people's tradition.
For centuries, the Roman Catholic Church has required its seminarians
to study philosophy before theology as many theological errors begin as
rationalist philosophical errors. Similarly, law students should receive
proper philosophical training because the basic legal error starts out as the
rationalist philosophical error. Requiring law students to study philosophy,
and postmodern philosophy in particular, will result in much less confusion
and frustration about the practical nature of the law and the legal process. A
more interesting, if not altogether brighter future for the whole legal system,
requires an increasing number of philosophically sophisticated attorneys
pressuring every judge to recognize the democratic intention of the law or
be discredited as an elitist and expert tyrant.
Of course, the very best way to assert the most legitimate purpose of the
law is to let the people vote for their judges. In the meantime the best way
to avoid both philosophical and legal error is to understand that justice is
established on the basis of some rival tradition, no matter how temporary its
seat. In that case, the dominant tradition on any bench ought to be the
tradition of the people, of the democracy - yes, of the majority.
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In a nutshell, all lawyers and judges have a tradition to fight for and
ought to admit it. They should respect the right of the people to review them
for what they really are. But more specifically, judges and lawyers who
really respect the law, who embrace the democratic tradition as such,
embrace its origins in ordinary language, just as good science understands
that it originates in ordinary language, and therefore, does not make claims
about Reality which go beyond it.
Most judges today are enemies of the democratic tradition - the
democratic theory of linguistic meaning, reason, knowledge and justice.
They are purebred elitists and experts. But, their time is running out. They
are being overtaken by the postmodern age in which their image is not
sophisticated and compelling, but nafve, irrational and tyrannical.
The modem judge habitually defends expert, agency interpretations of
the law. We need judges and lawyers who respect the democratic, ordinary
language of the law; anti-experts who do not make claims which go beyond
it; who do not attempt to transform it into their own private, expert
language supporting their private, expert understanding of justice.
Legal error exists in the failure to understand and support the
democratic tradition, the ordinary language of the law. Its meaning is
deeply infected by ordinary language. Expert, manipulative transformations
of that language into expert language is abhorrent; it is an unforgivable sin
- the blasphemy of the democratic spirit. And this is happening every day
in our elitist, expert driven, modem legal system.
It is from this view that a firm grounding in postmodem philosophy will
lead to better lawyers, better claims, better judges and eventually a better
judicial system.
The American judicial system essentially clings to a discredited
philosophy based on a Platonic-Aristotelian view of meaning, reason and
knowledge. This philosophy asserts that words have meanings which
transcend human language - the constantly evolving use of terms. From this
point of view, the courts are constantly presenting to the public the one true
meaning of "justice" - inclusive of derivative principles such as equality,
rights, freedom and liberty. In each successive case, the justices present the
universal meaning of justice as applied to the facts of that case.
The Platonic-Aristotelian philosophical method serves many political
needs of the Court: promoting judicial objectivity and coherence and
marketing judicial expertise. The Court operates practically to ensure its
existence as a co-equal third branch of government, to ensure adequate
funding and to obtain voluntary compliance with its opinions.
Specifically, how does the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophical method
work to support the Court's political purposes? Let us consider the U.S.
Supreme Court regularly petitioning Congress for funding. To obtain the
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funding, the Court promotes its judicial objectivity and coherence and
markets the need for judicial expertise. The Court's promotion of judicial
objectivity and its coherence makes the Court appear different than the
executive and legislative branches: transcendent of politics, non-political
and non-partisan.
Basically, the Court argues that Congress should fund the Court
because it is different than the other political branches. The Court argues
that it is the only source of objective justice among all of the government's
institutions. But of course, the only real source of relatively objective
justice is the democratic tradition which includes a whole view of Reality
(including the nature of reason and justice) made dominant by a people
which is not tyrannized by its own government, but by its own courts.
Similarly, the Court's marketing of the need for judicial expertise is
self-serving. The argument is that Congress should fund the Court because
we need nine justices, nine judicial experts, to tell us what justice is as the
object of the written law. When Congress agrees, Congress funds the Court
because Congress is convinced judicial expertise is required.
In contrast, in states with judicial elections, the political situation is
different. There, the courts do not promote the myths of judicial objectivity
and judicial expertise in the same way because those myths are inconsistent
with judicial elections. Judicial elections exist so judges will be forced to
apply the law by the light of the people's dominant tradition. There is
nothing in this to apologize for. Judicial elections are postmodern
realism.The judicial branch is political, not objective nor bipartisan. State
courts, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, seek funding while acknowledging
what they are: a politically selected tradition concerning the nature of
Reality, the good, the rational, the just.
POPULIZING PLATONIC-ARISTOTELIAN WORDS AND PHRASES
Neopopulist philosophy, as a practical understanding of language, has a
few simple rules. A word's meaning is determined by its use. All language
is public; there are no private languages.14 Ordinary words are preferred
over technical words. Disputes about language should be resolved
democratically, not through judicial coercion. Importantly, a language
tradition is created when a group of people agree to use language in a
specific way to describe human experience which is subjectively universal,
rooted in the same moral dispositions. For example, the word "marriage"
14. A private language is impossible for reasons which are subtle but available in the
Philosophical Investigations of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the favorite postmodern philosopher of the
neopopulist movement. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEfN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (John
Wiley & Sons, 2010).
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has different meanings because different language traditions define
"marriage" differently. For some, "friends" can be used as "friends with
benefits"; others in a different language tradition would object. Another
example is Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, where the U.S.
Supreme Court split on application of the First Amendment to judicial
candidates based on a disagreement whether a "judicial election" is an
"election" where candidates would have First Amendment rights." And, the
same can be said for any legal word where there is a dispute about the
word's meaning. Justice, equality, freedom and liberty are examples of
terms where different language traditions offer competing definitions.
The Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy, on the other hand, is not practical
and inclusive. In areas of dispute such as over the word "marriage," the
phrase "friends with benefits" or "judicial elections," this method claims
that a transcendent definition of the word or phrase exists. In other words, a
true meaning exists to the word "marriage" or the phrases "friends with
benefits" or "judicial elections." The goal of the Platonic-Aristotelian
philosophy is to search for the transcendent definition of the word or
phrase. Since the search may be difficult, elites and experts are required to
lead the way. Judges are our chief linguistic experts and culture makers in
the modem tradition. They hold sway over the language of the law without
democratic management. They manage the democracy. The democracy
does not manage them.
There is nothing in common between the Platonic-Aristotelian
philosophy and the postmodern, neopopulist understanding of language.
Where neopopulists point out that rival traditions compete to control the
use, and therefore the meaning, of words such as "marriage," the Platonic-
Aristotelian philosopher denies that view, seeing the "competition" as a
search for the true meaning of marriage in the Reality-of-the-law, if not in
Reality itself.
These different philosophical approaches result in different approaches
to democracy and republicanism. Neopopulism embraces competing
pluralistic language traditions and sees democracy as a necessary resolution.
Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy embraces the vague notions of the republic
and a merely supporting role for democracy, while insisting on experts and
elites to discern the true meaning of its principles to be lived by.
Neopopulism opposes democracy to rule-by-expert. This is because
every expert opinion is not simply technical, but very often caught up in a
whole view of Reality - in a view of what is good and just and rational.
Expert judgments which must insist on some goal, like those made every
day in the Environmental Protection Agency and other federal agencies, are
15. 536 U.S. 765, 803-04 (2002).
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also insisting on the goodness of that goal. And that judgment of goodness
in turn can only be justified as the implication of many more propositions
about the nature of Reality.
Accordingly, the role of the judge is very different for neopopulists and
the Platonic-Aristotelians. The neopopulist judge is strictly interpreting
laws to ensure that the democratic system is a fair arbiter of disputes
between competing traditions. The Platonic-Aristotelian judge is attempting
to find the supposedly true, transcendental meaning of the law that is in
dispute in order to ensure the stability and order with which he exercises
personal solidarity. After all, he is a judge. He is supposed to exercise
solidarity with THE TRUTH.
In this article, the term "populize" is introduced to highlight the
distinction between neopopulist philosophy and Platonic -Aristotelian
philosophy. "Populizing" challenges the Platonic-Aristotelian
transcendental view of Reality by noticing that there are at least two groups
of people who have made linguistic agreements which cast different
meanings on words being used in context.
Our way of deconstructing the rationalist pretense in the legal arena is
to populize the use of any key term at issue. We insist that the judge take
ordinary language seriously, the ordinary use of the term, and thereby
respect the democracy, leaving his own vanity behind. His failure to
populize the text of the positive law (his technical account of the language
of the law serving his relative tradition) discredits him in the eyes of the
people because it violates the people's tradition - as expressed in the law
itself. This is how we commit revolution.
Here are three familiar examples. First, the Platonic-Aristotelians state
that the word "marriage" has one true, transcendental meaning. The
neopopulist populizes "marriage" by pointing out that there are two groups,
Christians and gay rights supporters, who give contradictory definitions to
the word "marriage." There is no true, transcendental meaning to the word
"marriage." Second, the Platonic-Aristotelians state that the phrase "friends
with benefits" has one true, transcendental meaning. The neopopulist
populizes "friends with benefits" by pointing out that there is a group of
people who would agree with this use of the phrase "friends with benefits"
and others who would disagree with this use of the phrase "friends with
benefits." There is no true, transcendental meaning to the phrase "friends
with benefits." Third, the Platonic-Aristotelians state in the Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White dissent written by Justice Ginsberg that the
phrase "judicial elections" has one true, transcendental meaning which is
different than "legislative elections."1 6 The neopopulist populizes "judicial
16. 536 U.S. 765, 803-04 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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elections" by pointing out that there is a group of people who believe
"judicial elections" are "elections" and another group of people who believe
that "judicial elections" are not "elections." There is no true, transcendental
meaning to the phrase "judicial elections."
POPULIZING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY - HOBBY LOBBY
The critical legal issue in the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Hobby
Lobbyl7 is whether a for-profit business company's exercise of religion is
covered by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The Court's opinions
have Platonic-Aristotelian philosophical aspects.
As a preliminary matter, the justices agree that Hobby Lobby's owners
were religious people:
Hobby Lobby's statement of purpose commits the Greens to
"[h]onoring the Lord in all [they] do by operating the company in a
manner consistent with Biblical principles." App. in No. 13-354,
pp. 134-135 (complaint). Each family member has signed a pledge
to run the businesses in accordance with the family's religious
beliefs and to use the family assets to support Christian ministries.
723 F.3d, at 1122. In accordance with those commitments, Hobby
Lobby and Mardel stores close on Sundays, even though the Greens
calculate that they lose millions in sales annually by doing so. Id.,
at 1122; App. in No. 13-354, at 136-137. The businesses refuse to
engage in profitable transactions that facilitate or promote alcohol
use; they contribute profits to Christian missionaries and ministries;
and they buy hundreds of full-page newspaper ads inviting people
to "know Jesus as Lord and Savior.""
The majority and dissenting opinions differed on one issue that
illuminates the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy. Can a corporation exercise
religion protectable under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act? If this
question were asked on the street, many different answers would be
provided because the words in the question have so many different
meanings and uses. They are used in many different contexts, in many
different language games. The legal opinions work to persuade by
appealing to an implicit Platonic-Aristotelian view of linguistic meaning.
Each opinion works to convince the reader that their interpretation of the
words is absolutely correct.
First, the majority opinion states that the owners' religion caused
Hobby Lobby to engage in an exercise of religion which was covered by the
17. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014).
18. Id. at 2766.
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Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The majority opinion shows
Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy as it expresses that the corporation is
exercising religion regardless of its corporate form and profit motive.
The principal argument advanced by HHS and the principal dissent
regarding RFRA protection for Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and
Mardel, focuses not on the statutory term "person," but on the
phrase "exercise of religion." According to HHS and the dissent,
these corporations are not protected by RFRA because they cannot
exercise religion. Neither HHS nor the dissent, however, provides
any persuasive explanation for this conclusion.
Is it because of the corporate form? The corporate form alone
cannot provide the explanation because, as we have pointed out,
HHS concedes that nonprofit corporations can be protected by
RFRA. The dissent suggests that nonprofit corporations are special
because furthering their religious "autonomy ... often furthers
individual religious freedom as well." Post, at 2794 (quoting
Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 97
L.Ed.2d 273 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment)). But this
principle applies equally to for-profit corporations: Furthering their
religious freedom also "furthers individual religious freedom." In
these cases, for example, allowing Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and
Mardel to assert RFRA claims protects the religious liberty of the
Greens and the Hahns.
If the corporate form is not enough, what about the profit-making
objective? In Braunfeld, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d
563, we entertained the free-exercise claims of individuals who
were attempting to make a profit as retail merchants, and the Court
never even hinted that this objective precluded their claims. As the
Court explained in a later case, the "exercise of religion" involves
"not only belief and profession but the performance of (or
abstention from) physical acts" that are "engaged in for religious
reasons." Smith, 494 U.S., at 877, 110 S.Ct. 1595. Business
practices that are compelled or limited by the tenets of a religious
doctrine fall comfortably within that definition. Thus, a law that
"operates so as to make the practice of . .. religious beliefs more
expensive" in the context of business activities imposes a burden on
the exercise of religion. Braunfeld, supra, at 605, 81 S.Ct. 1144; see
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d
127 (1982) (recognizing that "compulsory participation in the social
security system interferes with [Amish employers'] free exercise
rights").
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If, as Braunfeld recognized, a sole proprietorship that seeks to make
a profit may assert a free-exercise claim, why can't Hobby Lobby,
Conestoga, and Mardel do the same?1 9
But, the dissenting opinion disagrees. A corporation cannot exercise
religion because it is a corporation and because it has a profit motive. But
why would this use of the word "religion", this dogmatic assertion of the
incompatibility of religion, incorporation, and profit, be any more
authoritative than the ordinary use of it implicitly defended in the decision
above (despite the lack of an explicitly postmodern analysis)? It could only
be more authoritative from an expert point of view where the left-leaning
"experts" hereabouts are attempting to accumulate a coherent body of
common law which constrains the use of the term "religion" to their
relative, tradition-bound goals - to their completely relative existential
motivations. There is no attempt here to understand the term
democratically. The dissenting opinion states that a corporation cannot
exercise religion:
The First Amendment's free exercise protections, the Court has
indeed recognized, shelter churches and other nonprofit religion-
based organizations. "For many individuals, religious activity
derives meaning in large measure from participation in a larger
religious community," and "furtherance of the autonomy of
religious organizations often furthers individual religious freedom
as well." Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342, 107 S.Ct.
2862, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
The Court's "special solicitude to the rights of religious
organizations," Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and
School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. -, -, 132 S.Ct. 694, 706, 181
L.Ed.2d 650 (2012), however, is just that. No such solicitude is
traditional for commercial organizations. Indeed, until today,
religious exemptions had never been extended to any entity
operating in "the commercial, profit-making world." Amos, 483
U.S., at 337, 107 S.Ct. 2862.
The reason why is hardly obscure. Religious organizations exist to
foster the interests of persons subscribing to the same religious
faith. Not so of for-profit corporations. Workers who sustain the
operations of those corporations commonly are not drawn from one
religious community. Indeed, by law, no religion-based criterion
can restrict the work force of for-profit corporations. See 42 U.S.C.
19. Id. at 2769-70.
Populizing Religious Liberty and Hobby Lobby
§§ 2000e(b), 2000e-1(a), 2000e-2(a); cf. Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 80-81, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 53 L.Ed.2d
113 (1977) (Title VII requires reasonable accommodation of an
employee's religious exercise, but such accommodation must not
come "at the expense of other[ employees]"). The distinction
between a community made up of believers in the same religion
and one embracing persons of diverse beliefs, clear as it is,
constantly escapes the Court's attention. One can only wonder why
the Court shuts this key difference from sight.2 0
From the neopopulist philosophical view, both opinions are engaged in
Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy. Fortunately, there is an implicit respect
for the democratic use of the term "religion" in the majority's opinion, but
without the sophisticated explicit, postmodern analysis we long for as the
source of good faith and a much more interesting and relevant legal process.
The majority opinion states what a corporation is transcendentally - an
organization of people - and then states that it can exercise religion. The
dissenting opinion states what a corporation is transcendentally - a for-
profit company - and then states that it cannot exercise religion. The
common parishioner just knows very well that a business can have a
religious culture.
As a neopopulist, I understand that the opinions are not actually
dialoguing with each other. They are incommensurate uses of language.
They are rival traditions - one secular, one religious. Sound familiar? Yes,
the issue of "corporations exercising religion" is much the same as
"marriage," "friends with benefits" and "judicial elections."
According to neopopulist philosophy, the Platonic-Aristotelian
philosophy leads only to an appearance of a dialogue, an appearance of
shared legal reason, relating to how religious liberty applies to the facts.
But, since there is no disagreement about the facts (except the facts about
religion, whether it has attribute x or y, or not x, and so on), the real
disagreement among the justices is actually traditional, paradigmatic. It is a
disagreement about whether or not it is a fact that religion is like this or like
that. It is an amazingly blatant disagreement about the nature of Reality, a
very important part ofReality. It is a fundamental disagreement about what
religion is - its range and reach in the human experience.
It is not surprising that secularists incommensurately think that religion
can, and should be, compartmentalized. This is consonant with their goals.
The opinion does not address religious liberty. It addresses the nature of
religion in itself and in doing so, appeals implicitly to many propositions
about the true nature of man and his enterprises - the extent to which it is
20. Id. at 2794-95.
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all morally integrated by nature. This is metaphysics. There is no moral and
religious theory without metaphysics. From a democratic point of view, the
dissenting opinion is anti-democratic bad faith - literally immoral.
At best, the dissenting opinion is philosophically sophomoric. The
common parishioner knows that God expects allegiance in every part of his
life; there is no compartmentalization of religious faith as such. The
imposition of the minority view would be blatant tyranny, a clear violation
of the First Amendment from a democratic point of view.
So, even Supreme Court justices can be tragically unsophisticated in
their lack of philosophical self-consciousness. It is all philosophy. It is all
just a dispute between traditions, and therefore, between paradigms of
language. It is all about competing language games. The most
unsophisticated symptom of all is that the Court minority does not care to
become more conscious. It knows little more than the grip of expert power
exercised on behalf of goals, which are entirely relative. In their
condescension to democracy, judges become the most self-deluded
characters on the modem stage.
Of course, the time of modem "reason" is waning. The postmodern age
is in hot pursuit. And like a wolf, its indifference to the judiciary's modem
understanding of themselves and their role will shock them, and frighten
them, to their rationalist core.
